Aesthetic Theory

 

Theodor W. Adorno

 

Translated and edited by Robert Hullot-Kentor


Aesthetic Theory

By: Theodor W. Adorno

Translated and edited by: Robert Hullot-Kentor

 

TranslatorÕs Introduction

 

 

Art, Society, Aesthetics

 

o      Artworks detach themselves from the empirical world and bring forth another world, one opposed to the empirical world as if this other world too were an autonomous entity.

o      Posed from on high, the question whether something such as film is or is no longer art leads nowhere.

o      Art can be understood only by its laws of movement, not according to any set of invariants. It is defined by its relation to what it is not.

o      Admixed with artÕs own concept is the ferment of its own abolition.

o      There is no aesthetic refraction without something being refracted; no imagination without something imagined. This holds true particularly in the case of artÕs immanent purposiveness.

o      Art concerns less the fact that it is manufactured than its own inner constitution.

o      Artworks are alive in that they speak in a fashion that is denied to natural objects and the subjects who make them.

o      The communication of artworks with what is external to them, with the world from which they blissfully or unhappily seal themselves off, occurs through noncommunication; precisely thereby they prove themselves refracted.

o      Every artwork is an instant; every successful work is a cessation, a suspended moment of the process, in which it reveals itself to the unwavering eye. If artworks are answers to their own questions, they themselves thereby truly become questions.

o      The unity of both, of reportage and linguistic perfectionism, accounts for the bookÕs unfaded actuality.

o      For no single select category, not even the aesthetically central concept of the law of form, names the essence of art and suffices to judge its products.

o      Art is related to its other as is a magnet to a field of iron fillings.

o      ArtÕs unconscious self-consciousness derives from its participation in the cast of the illusion of its purely spiritual being.

o      Art is the social antithesis of society not directly deducible from it.

o      Among artists of the highest rank, such as Beethoven or Rembrandt, the sharpest sense of reality was joined with estrangement from reality.

o      ÒThe liking that we combine with the representation of the existence of an object.Ó

o      For, once shorn of what Kant calls interest, satisfaction becomes so indeterminate that it no longer serves to define beauty.

o      There is no art that does not contain in itself as an element, negated, what it repulses.

o      The dignity of artworks depends on the intensity of the interest from which they are wrested.

o      For Kant, aesthetics becomes paradoxically a castrated hedonism, desire without desire.

o      The moment, however, the artwork comports itself by retaining the negativity of reality and taking a position toward it, the concept of disinterestedness is also modified.

o      For him who has a genuine relation to art, in which he himself vanishes, art is not an object.

o      Incontestably, no one would devote himself to art without Ð as the bourgeois put it Ð getting something out of it.

o      Yet precisely because they were sacred, the art objects were not objects of enjoyment.

o      The spiritualization of art incited the rancor of the excluded and spawned consumer art as a genre, which conversely antipathy toward consumer art compelled artists to ever more reckless spiritualization.

o      Whoever disappears into the artwork thereby gains dispensation from the impoverishment of a life that is always too little.

o      Only in memory and longing, not as a copy or as an immediate effect, is pleasure absorbed by art.

o      In many of MozartÕs compositions the delicacy of expression evokes the sweetness of the human voice.

o      The taboo on the sensual ultimately encroaches on the opposite of pleasure because, even as the remotest echo, pleasure is sensed in its specific negation.

o      The happiness gained from artworks is that of having suddenly escaped, not a morsel of that from which art escaped.

o      What the work demands from its beholder is knowledge, and indeed, knowledge that does justice to it: The work wants its truth and untruth to be grasped.

 

Situation

 

 

On The Categories Of The Ugly, The Beautiful, and Technique

 

o      NietzscheÕs dictum that all good things were once dreadful things, like SchellingÕs insight into the terror of the beginning, may well have had their origins in the experience of art.

o      In back of the word spleen is the obsession with what resists being formed, with the transformation of what is hostile to art into artÕs own agent, which thus extends artÕs concept beyond that of the ideal.

o      Great artworks, as destructive works, have also retained the power to destroy in the authority of their success.

o      Beauty establishes a sphere of untouchability; works become beautiful by the force of their opposition to what simply exists.

o      There is no denying that even in the principle of construction, in the dissolution of materials and their subordination to an imposed unity, once again something smooth, harmonistic, a quality of pure logicality, is conjured up that seeks to establish itself as ideology.

o      Construction is the synthesis of the diverse at the expense of the qualitative elements that it masters, and at the expense of the subject, which intends to extinguish itself as it carries out this synthesis. The affinity of construction with cognitive processes, or perhaps rather with their interpretation by the theory of knowledge, is no less evident than is their difference, which is that art does not make judgments and when it does, it shatters its own concept. What distinguishes construction from composition in the encompassing sense of pictorial composition, is the ruthless subordination not only of everything that originated from outside the artwork, but also of all partial elements immanent to the work. To this extent construction is the extension of subjective domination, which conceals itself all the more profoundly the further it is driven. Construction tears the elements of reality out of their primary context and transforms them to the point where they are once again capable of forming a unity, one that is no less imposed on them internally than was the heteronomous unity to which they were subjected externally. By means of construction, art desperately wants to escape from its nominalistic situation, to extricate itself by its own power from a sense of accidentalness and attain what is overarchingly binding or, if one will, universal.

o      Art that is simply a thing is an oxymoron. Yet the development of this oxymoron is nevertheless the inner direction of contemporary art. Art is motivated by a conflict: Its enchantment, a vestige of its magical phase, is constantly repudiated as unmediated sensual immediacy by the progressive disenchantment of the world, yet without it ever being possible finally to obliterate this magical element.

 

 

Natural Beauty

 

 

Art Beauty

 

o      Nature is beautiful in that it appears to say more than it is. To wrest this more from that moreÕs contingency, to gain control of its semblance, to determine it as semblance as well as to negate it as unreal: This is the idea of art.

o      Artworks become artworks in the production of this more; they produce their own transcendence, rather than being its arena, and thereby they once again become separated from transcendence. The actual arena of transcendence in artworks is the nexus of their elements.

o      Only in the achievement of this transcendence, not foremost and indeed probably never through meanings, are artworks spiritual.

o      Equally, however, art betrays transcendence when it seeks to produce it as an effect.

o      Artworks remain enlightened because they would like to make commensurable to human beings the remembered shudder, which was incommensurable in the magical primordial world.

o      Artworks surpass the world of things by what is thing-like in them, their artificial objectivation.

o      In each genuine artwork something appears that does not exist.

o      In art something momentary transcends; objectivation makes the artwork into an instant.

o      Artworks are only able to become other than thing by becoming a thing, though not through their localization in space and time but only by an immanent process of reification that makes them self-same, self-identical. Otherwise one could not speak of their spirit, that is, of what is utterly unthinglike.

o      In society as a whole, it is art that should introduce chaos into order rather than the reverse.

Semblance and Expression

 

 

Enigmaticalness, Truth Content, Metaphysics

 

o      There is no answer that would convince someone who would ask such questions as ÒWhy imitate something?Ó or ÒWhy tell a story as if it were true when obviously the facts are otherwise and it just distorts reality?Ó Artworks fall helplessly mute before the question ÒWhatÕs it for?Ó and before the reproach that they are actually pointless.

o      One understands something of art, not that one understands art.

o      Those manifestly incomprehensible works that emphasize their enigmaticalness are potentially the most comprehensible.

o      No concept that enters an artwork remains what it is.

o      Art judges exclusively by abstaining from judgment; this is the defense of naturalism.

o      All artworks are writing, not just those that are obviously such; they are hieroglyphs for which the code has been lost, a loss that plays into their content.

o      Artworks speak like elves in fairy tales: ÒIf you want the absolute, you shall have it, but you will not recognize it when you see it.Ó

o      Art is what remains after the loss of what was supposed to exercise a magical, and later a cultic, function. ArtÕs why-and-wherefore Ð its archaic rationality, to put it paradoxically Ð was forfeited and transformed into an element of its being-in-itself. Art thus became an enigma; if it no longer exists for the purpose that it infused with meaning, then what is it?

o      Great artworks are unable to lie. Even when their content is semblance, insofar as this content is necessary semblance the content has truth, to which the artworks testify; only failed works are untrue.

o      The appearing, whereby the artwork far surpasses the mere subject, is the eruption of the subjectÕs collective essence.

o      Of all the paradoxes of art, no doubt the innermost one is that only through making, through the production of particular works specifically and completely formed in themselves, and never through any immediate vision, does art achieve what is not made, the truth.

o      Artworks would be powerless if they were no more than longing, though there is no valid artwork without longing.

o      By retracing this figure, they are not only more than what simply exists but participate in objective truth to the extent that what is in need summons its fulfillment and change. Not for-itself, with regard to consciousness, but in-itself, what is wants the other; the artwork is the language of this wanting, and the artworkÕs content is as substantial as this wanting.

o      Ever since PlatoÕs doctrine of anamnesis the not-yet-existing has been dreamed of in remembrance, which alone concretizes utopia without betraying it to experience.

o      Artworks say what is more than the existing, and they do this exclusively by making a constellation of how it is, ÒComment cÕest.Ó

o      An artwork is, as Beckett wrote, a desecration of silence.

o      No artwork cedes to another.

 

Coherence and Meaning